

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 ACDA-05

NRC-05 /089 W

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R 031745Z OCT 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3866

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T USNATO 5406

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJ: MBFR: OPTION III: PUBLIC PRESENTATION

REF: A. STATE 233058 DTG 302310Z SEP 75

B. MBFR VIENNA 340 DTG 291545Z SEP 75

1. AT OCTOBER 2 SPC MEETING, US AND FRG INTRODUCED THEIR  
RESPECTIVE PAPERS ON PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF OPTION III, AS  
REPRESENTING A DIVISION OF LABOR UNDERTAKEN BY THE TWO COUNTRIES.  
THE US PAPER WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A. IT CONTAINS THE  
LANGUAGE ABOUT RESPONDING TO EASTERN CONCERN FOR WHICH PARA 3 C,  
REF A EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE. WE ADVISED FRG REP (HOYNCK)  
PRIVATELY OF OUR PREFERENCE FOR THIS LANGUAGE, AND OUR  
WILLINGNESS TO DELETE IT IF FRG INSISTS. THE FRG PAPER CONTAINS  
THE CONCLUDING PARA RECOMMENDED IN PARA 4, REF A, I.E. THE  
LANGUAGE PROPOSED IN PARA 2, REF B. HOYNCK HAD NOT YET HEARD  
FROM BONN ON THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THIS REVISION OF THE FRG

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PAPER, BUT AGREED TO MAKE THE REVISION ON HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITY.

2. FOR EASE OF REFERENCE, THE FRG PAPER AS SUBMITTED IN SPC  
IS AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN FRG TEXT:

CONTINGENCY-ARGUMENTS FOR PRESSING PUBLIC QUESTIONS AND BASIS  
FOR BACK-GROUND TALKS

1. TO EXPLAIN THE PURPOSE OF NATO'S NUCLEAR PROPOSAL:

- THE WESTERN PROPOSAL IS DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT ON A BALANCED AND THEREFORE MORE STABLE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

- NATO REMAINS CONVINCED THAT THE MAJOR DESTABILIZING FACTOR FOR THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS THE EASTERN GROUND FORCE PREPONDERANCE, PARTICULARLY IN MANPOWER AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THE ALLIANCE THEREFORE MAINTAINS ITS VIEW THAT AN AGREEMENT MUST BRING ABOUT APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES TAKING INTO ACCOUNT A REDUCTION OF THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

- THIS - AND THIS ONLY - IS THE PURPOSE OF THE OFFER TO REDUCE CERTAIN US NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. IT IS CORRECT THAT THE EAST FROM THE VERY BEGINNING PROPOSED A PROPORTIONATE ACROSS-THE-BOARD REDUCTION OF ALL FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD LEAVE INTACT THE CURRENT DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES THOUGH AT LOWER LEVELS, THEREBY DIMINISHING NATO SECURITY.

THE ALLIES DO NOT CONSIDER ACCEPTING SUCH AN APPROACH.

- THE ALLIED INITIATIVE IS A ONE-TIME OFFER AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A STEP TOWARD FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR OR AIR FORCES OR IN EQUIPMENT. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THIS ONE-TIME OFFER AND AS FAR AS IT GOES, THE WEST DOES, HOWEVER, TAKE THE EASTERN POSITION INTO ACCOUNT.

2. TO EXPLAIN THE "MAKE WEIGHT"-CHARACTER OF THE OFFER:

THE ALLIANCE PURSUES ITS ORIGINAL AIM OF BRINGING ABOUT THROUGH MBFR A BALANCED GROUND FORCE RELATIONSHIP. THE NUCLEAR OFFER SERVES AS AN ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE JUST THIS. THUS THE ALLIANCE DID NOT ACCEPT THE EASTERN CONCEPT OF GENERALLY INCLUDING NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES IN REDUCTIONS. RATHER, THE (WESTERN) NUCLEAR OFFER IS DESIGNED TO INCREASE THE INCENTIVE FOR THE EAST TO ACCEPT THE FUNDAMENTAL WESTERN PROPOSAL OF ESTABLISHING A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING. IN OTHER WORDS: IT SHOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT NOW FOR THE EAST TO BLOCK THE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH REFUSING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF APPROXIMATE

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GROUND FORCE PARITY.

3. TO ASSURE THE EXCLUSION OF EUROPEAN SYSTEMS:

A REDUCTION OF NON-US NUCLEAR DELIVERY MEANS AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE INCLUSION OF (WEST-)EUROPEAN ARMAMENTS IN REDUCTIONS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST. THEREFORE, THERE WILL NOT BE NEGATIVE REPERCUSSIONS ON NATO'S INTEGRATED DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS OR ON EUROPEAN COOPERATION IN THE MILITARY FIELD.

4. TO EXPLAIN THE LIMITS OF THE OFFER:

THE NUCLEAR OFFER IS VALID PROVIDED THE EAST SHOWS ITSELF READY TO AGREE TO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF ESTABLISHING APPROXIMATE GROUND FORCE PARITY AND ONLY IN THAT EVENT.

IT IS THEREFORE A ONE-TIME OFFER WHICH CANNOT BE INTERPRETED AS INDICATING A TREND TOWARDS NUCLEAR DISENGAGEMENT. THE REDUCTIONS OFFERED WOULD ONLY CONCERN SOME NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, AND THESE WOULD ONLY BE DECREASED BY A CERTAIN CALCULATED NUMBER. CONSEQUENTLY, THE ABILITY TO CARRY OUT NUCLEAR DEFENCE AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS, ALSO BASED ON EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION, WILL NOT BE JEOPARDIZED.

5. TO ASSURE CONTINUED NUCLEAR SHARING:

WITHIN THE ALLIANCE CARE HAS BEEN TAKEN TO ASSURE THAT THE PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR DEFENCE OF THE ALLIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPE - SOMETIMES CALLED "NUCLEAR SHARING" - WILL REAMIN AS IT IS. THE NON-US NUCLEAR UNITS WILL FULLY MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT FUNCTION AND EFFECTIVENESS.

6. TO EXPLAIN THAT NATO'S STRATEGY REMAINS VALID:

IF THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS OF US GROUND FORCES AND NUCLEAR ELEMENTS TAKE PLACE, NATO WOULD RETAIN FULLY ADEQUATE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DETER WAR IN EUROPE THROUGH THE AGREED NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. THIS STRATEGY CONSISTING OF THE TRIAD OF NATO DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL, TACTICAL-NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC DEFENCE - WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE BASIS OF ALLIED DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS IN EUROPE.

7. TO EXPLAIN THAT STRATEGIC DECOUPLING WILL NOT TAKE PLACE:

THE US COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENCE OF ITS ALLIES IN WESTERN EUROPE REMAINS FIRM AND UNCHANGED. THE US WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN IN EUROPE LARGE AND HIGHLY CAPABLE FORCES, BOTH

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CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR. THIS LARGE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCE DEMONSTRATES US RESOLVE TO PARTICIPATE WITH THE ALLIES IN THE DEFENCE OF THE NATO AREA. MOREOVER, THIS COMMITMENT IS BACKED BY LARGE CONVENTIONAL FORCES THAT CAN REINFORCE EUROPE AND ULTIMATELY BY THE US STRATEGIC DETERRENT. THE OFFER OF REDUCING CERTAIN NUCLEAR ELEMENTS THEREFORE WILL NOT LEAD TO A "DECOUPLING" OF THE ESCALATORY CONNECTION OF NATO'S DETERRENCE, NOR WILL IT AFFECT THE NATO "TRIAD" OF DEFENCE.

8. TO ASSURE CONTINUED IR/MRBM TARGET COVERAGE:

THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING OFFER DOES NOT PUT INTO QUESTION THE PRESENT COVERAGE OF THOSE SOVIET IR/MRBM'S WHICH ARE TARGETTED AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE.

9. TO EXPLAIN LACK OF FULL RECIPROCITY:

(REPEAT ANSWER 1 ABOVE)

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT NATO'S OBJECTIVE IN PROPOSING TO REDUCE CERTAIN NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE REDUCTIONS WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE WILL DIFFER IN SOME RESPECTS FOR EACH SIDE. THIS IS SO BECAUSE THE WEST IS CRITICALLY CONCERNED WITH THE EASTERN GROUND FORCE PREPONDERANCE,

PARTICULARLY IN MANPOWER AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS, AND SEEKS AN AGREEMENT THAT RESULTS IN APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES AND A REDUCTION OF THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

ONE MAY ADD THAT MBFR AGREEMENTS CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO REDUCE SOVIET NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES IN THE SOVIET UNION. BY THE SAME TOKEN, NATO DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OUTSIDE THE AGREED AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT BE REDUCED EITHER.  
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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 18 AUG 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 03 OCT 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** greeneet  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975NATO05406  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** NATO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t197510101/abbrzmiq.tel  
**Line Count:** 175  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** n/a  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** A. STATE 233058 DTG 302310Z SEP 75 B. MBFR VIENNA 340 DTG 291545Z SEP 75  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** greeneet  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 03 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <03 APR 2003 by SmithRJ>; APPROVED <16 SEP 2003 by greeneet>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR: OPTION III: PUBLIC PRESENTATION  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO, MBFR  
**To:** STATE  
SECDEF INFO MBFR VIENNA  
BONN  
LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006